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HAVE GUN—WILL TRAVEL? 
BRANNON P. DENNING* 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
This Article was submitted to Law & Contemporary Problems in December, 
2019, before the Court had held oral arguments in New York Rifle. It was almost 
through the editorial process when, on April 27, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued a per curiam opinion in which it concluded that the case was moot because 
the law had been changed to grant the relief that the appellants sought. The Article 
has not been changed substantially to reflect that development. Nevertheless, I 
think that the Article still makes a modest contribution to the literature on hybrid 
rights cases. I’m unaware of any other commentary on New York Rifle that views 
the case through a hybrid rights lens. Had the Second Circuit appreciated that 
aspect of the case and adjusted its analysis accordingly—as I argue that it should 




In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York, the Second 
Circuit confronted the constitutionality of a New York City rule that prohibited 
those licensed to possess a firearm in their residence from transporting that 
firearm to shooting competitions or gun ranges outside New York’s five 
boroughs.1 The plaintiffs challenged it as a violation of their Second Amendment 
rights, the right to travel, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD), and 
the First Amendment. The Second Circuit rejected all of their constitutional 
challenges; the plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted. If the case is not now moot,2 gun rights supporters might look 
forward to the first major Second Amendment decision in a decade—one that 
might expand the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, conferring a measure 
of protection for arms bearing outside the home. 
 
Copyright © 2020 by Brannon P. Denning. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
*Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Starnes Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, 
Samford University. With apologies to the late Richard Boone. Thanks to the editorial staff for their deft 
edits and brilliant suggestions. This Article is much better for their efforts.  
 1.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated as moot, 
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam). 
 2.  The State amended its law to allow premises permittees to travel within the state; the City also 
apparently indicated it would no longer enforce its rule. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: 
Battling Over Mootness, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/08/scotus-for-
law-students-battling-over-mootness/ [https://perma.cc/82RZ-Y9EN]. 
BOOK PROOF - DENNING (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2020  10:12 PM 
98 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:97 
Even if the case is moot, New York Rifle furnishes an opportunity to examine 
how courts analyze cases in which multiple constitutional rights are implicated. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has, from time to time, explicitly held3 or suggested 
implicitly4 that governmental action implicating two or more independent 
constitutional rights might trigger a heightened standard of scrutiny than either 
right would trigger by itself. The notion of hybrid rights, however, remains 
controversial and undertheorized.5 
I argue here that the Second Circuit erred in separating the constitutional 
claims—the Second Amendment and the right to travel in particular—and in 
examining each in isolation. The court’s characterization of the right to travel, 
moreover, was much narrower than that given to it by the Court’s contemporary 
right-to-travel cases. Drawing on the work of Michael Coenen,6 I argue that the 
right to travel (itself a product of hybrid rights analysis), combined with the 
Second Amendment, should have resulted in the New York rule being subject to 
more searching scrutiny than that applied by the Second Circuit. 
Part II discusses the origins of the “right to travel,” its early treatment by the 
Court, and the Court’s contemporary right-to-travel jurisprudence. The shifting 
textual basis for the right, I argue, is due to the fact that a careful reading of the 
recent cases shows the right to travel to be a combination of rights, or a hybrid 
right. Part III surveys the New York Rifle case itself, especially the Second 
Circuit’s treatment of the Second Amendment and right-to-travel claims. Part IV 
argues that the court erred in separating the two rights, analyzing each separately, 
and concluding that the New York rule violated neither the Second Amendment 
nor the right to travel. The court should have analyzed the rule using a higher 
standard of review associated with other hybrid rights cases where, at the least, 
New York should have borne the burden of showing how its rule was necessary 
to further its state interests. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
 
 3.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (suggesting that Free Exercise claims in 
which the Court applied strict scrutiny were “hybrid rights” cases that implicated constitutional rights 
such as free speech in addition to free exercise rights). 
 4.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–05 (2015) (holding that restricting the 
fundamental right to marry to male-female couples violated the Due Process and Equal Protection rights 
of same-sex couples; suggesting interdependence between the two). 
 5.  See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About Hybrid Rights and Religious Groups, 
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192 (2007); Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The 
Persisting Relevance of the “Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 
597 (2014); Ryan S. Rummage, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious Liberty, 64 
EMORY L.J. 1175 (2015); Bradley L. Davis, Comment, Compelled Expression of the Religiously 
Forbidden: Pharmacists, “Duty to Fill” Statutes, and the Hybrid Rights Exception, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 97 
(2006). 
 6.  See generally Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 
(2016). 
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II 
THE RIGHT(S) TO TRAVEL 
This Part sketches a brief history of the right to travel, which has roots in the 
Anglo-American legal tradition dating back to the Magna Carta. It then traces 
the evolution of the right from the Articles of Confederation (which explicitly 
mentioned the right to travel) and the Constitution of 1787 (which did not). As 
we shall see in this Part, there is no single “right to travel”; the right instead 
encompasses at least four distinct rights, only one of which—mobility inside the 
United States—is implicated by New York Rifle. But that aspect of the right to 
travel, in turn, has been invoked by the Court when invalidating distinct laws held 
to infringe aspects of that interstate mobility right. For its part, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has been, as John Hart Ely memorably put it, “almost smug” in its refusal 
to identify a specific textual source for the right.7 Early cases gestured in various 
directions, before contemporary Courts settled on the Commerce Clause, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and even the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause as sources—depending on which 
aspect of interstate mobility was impinged in a particular case. I argue that the 
reason for the lack of a single textual basis for the right is simple: the right to 
travel represents a particular combination of different constitutional clauses—
hybrid rights, in other words.8 
A. Origins 
The Magna Carta, the fundamental charter of rights first signed in 1215,9 
included two provisions touching on a right to travel. First, “merchants” were 
given the right to “enter or leave England unharmed and without fear,” and could 
“stay or travel within it, by land or water, for purposes of trade, free from all 
illegal exactions” except enemy aliens during time of war.10 In addition, the 
charter pronounced it “lawful for any man to leave and return to our kingdom 
unharmed and without fear, by land or water, preserving his allegiance to us . . . 
for some short period, for the common benefit of the realm.”11 Again, there was 
a wartime exception. 
However, the guild system and various apprenticeship statutes greatly 
restricted movement—as a practical matter—within England itself in the Tudor, 
Elizabethan, and Stuart reigns.12 These restrictions on freedom of movement 
caused frustration, which incentivized English citizens “to go to the great open 
 
 7.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 177 (1980). 
 8.  See Coenen, supra note 6, at 1078–82 (2016) (discussing “right/right combinations,” a particular 
type of hybrid rights); see also infra Part II.D. 
 9.  See MAGNA CARTA (1215). 
 10.  Id. at cl. 41; see also Leonard B. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 
47, 47–48 (1956). 
 11.  MAGNA CARTA, supra note 9, at cl. 42. 
 12.  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 163–65 
(First Kansas Paperback 1968) (1956). 
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spaces in her American colonies.”13 The locomotive freedom sought by emigres 
to America was apparently enshrined in colonial charters, which either expressly 
referenced freedom to travel or took “internal freedom of movement for 
granted.”14 By the eighteenth century, Blackstone was including within the 
common law’s protection of personal liberty “the power of locomotion, of 
changing situation, or of moving one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination 
may direct.”15 When King George III proclaimed the frontier west of the 
Appalachians closed in 1763, his decision was “steadily resented” and 
contributed to the colonists’ alienation from Great Britain.16 
Following Independence, the new states “took freedom of movement as 
much for granted as when they were colonies,”17 as evidenced by Article IV of 
the Articles of Confederation, which explicitly guaranteed the right to enter and 
exit the various states. Specifically, it provided for “free ingress and regress to 
and from any other State,” and afforded foreign residents, with certain 
limitations, “all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . . .”18 Only 
“paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice” were denied the right freely to 
travel.19 
The Constitution of 1787, too, had an article—Article IV—that guaranteed 
interstate comity. Curiously, it omitted the explicit protections for travel, 
property ownership, and nondiscrimination contained in the Articles.20 Charles 
Pinckney, a South Carolina delegate, later took credit for the inclusion of the 
provision and said that the Constitution’s more succinct Article IV was “formed 
exactly upon the principles of the 4th article” of the Confederation.21 In Federalist 
42, James Madison implied that the Constitution’s Article IV was an 
improvement on the Articles of Confederation version because the latter was 
confusing and redundant.22 The important point was that free inhabitants of a 
state who were not citizens of that state were “entitled, in every other State, to 
all the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than 
 
 13.  Id. at 166. 
 14.  Id. at 173–74, 177. 
 15.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. 
 16.  CHAFFEE, supra note 12, at 181–82. 
 17.  Id. at 184. 
 18.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 reads, in part, “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Section 1 is the “full faith and credit clause”; 
the remainder of Section 2 requires extradition of fugitives from one state to another, provides for the 
return of fugitive slaves. Section 3 prohibits the partition of existing states and empowers Congress to 
make “all needful Rules and Regulations” respecting its territories or property. Section 4 guarantees 
states a “Republican Form of Government” to protect them against invasion and domestic insurrection. 
 21.  Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention 
in Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1788, at 106, 
112 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
 22.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 220 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds. 
2001). 
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they may be entitled to in their own state . . . .”23 Nevertheless, the absence of an 
explicit textual foundation for the right has vexed both courts24 and 
commentators.25 
B. Early Right to Travel Cases 
As alluded to above, there are four different “rights” involving travel: (1) 
freedom of mobility within the United States; (2) freedom to emigrate; (3) 
freedom to enter; and (4) the right not to travel or be forcibly exiled.26 In this 
Article, I am concerned only with the first, domestic mobility—the ability to 
move within and among states.  
In early domestic mobility cases, the Court struggled to articulate a textual 
basis for a constitutional proposition that its Justices thought self-evident. When 
Nevada attempted to impose a one-dollar capitation tax on every person leaving 
the state by common carrier, one stage line owner refused to pay. In Crandall v. 
Nevada, decided in 1867, the Court sided with the owner.27 Offered the choice 
between invalidating the statute as a violation of the DCCD or the Import-
Export Clause,28 it chose neither. Reasoning from structure29 and citing the 
paradigmatic structural opinion, McCulloch v. Maryland,30 the Court wrote that: 
[The] government has a right to call to [the capital] any or all of its citizens to aid in its 
service, as members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments, and to 
fill all its other offices; and this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleasure of a 
State over whose territory they must pass to reach the point where these services must 
be rendered. The government, also, has its offices of secondary importance in all other 
parts of the country . . . . In all these it demands the services of its citizens, and is entitled 
to bring them to those points from all quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in 
a State to obstruct this right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which 
the government was established. 
. . . . 
. . . . [T]he citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of 
government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any 
business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in 
administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which 
all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, 
the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and 
this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must 
pass in the exercise of it.31 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See infra notes 27–86 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See CHAFFEE, supra note 12, at 184–85, 189–92. 
 26.  Id. at 188. 
 27.  73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
 28.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (banning states from imposing imposts or duties on “imports 
and exports” without congressional permission). 
 29.  See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
16–22 (1969) (citing Crandall as an example of structural reasoning). 
 30.  See Crandall, 73 U.S. at 45 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) as the leading 
authority for structural reasoning).  
 31.  Id. at 43–44. 
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Justice Clifford, with Chief Justice Chase, dissented; not because they thought 
the law should be upheld, but because they thought the Court should have rested 
on the DCCD.32 
Williams v. Fears, decided in 1900, suggests why the Court was reluctant to 
ground the right to travel in the Commerce Clause alone.33 Georgia had imposed 
a tax on “emigrant agents”34—those who were “engaged in hiring laborers in 
Georgia to be employed beyond the limits of the state.”35 The tax was challenged 
as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as of the 
DCCD. Turning aside the Due Process and Equal Protection challenges, the 
Court conceded that the right to travel within the domestic territory “[was] an 
attribute of personal liberty . . . secured by the 14th Amendment and by other 
provisions of the Constitution,”36 but it rejected the argument that the tax 
violated the Commerce Clause because it did not think that any actual 
“commerce” between the states was involved.37 Given that the Court, at the time 
and until the post-1937 era, made careful distinctions between commerce qua 
commerce and activities that preceded but were not a part of it,38 the Commerce 
Clause provided an uncertain footing for any right to travel. 
By 1941, however, the Court’s doctrine had evolved to the point that a 
majority of the Court had no problem rooting the right to travel in the Commerce 
Clause. Prior to Edwards v. California,39 California had made it unlawful to bring 
“indigents” into the state. Edwards was prosecuted for bringing over his 
unemployed brother-in-law from Texas.40 California defended its law—some 
version of which had been in effect since the mid-nineteenth century—as a valid 
exercise of its police powers.41 
The Court first noted that “it is settled beyond question that the 
transportation of persons is ‘commerce,’ within the meaning of [the Commerce 
Clause].”42 It further conceded that states nevertheless “are not wholly precluded 
 
 32.  Id. at 49 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
 33.  179 U.S. 270 (1900). 
 34.  Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 273 (1900). 
 35.  Id. at 276. 
 36.  Id. at 274. The Court rejected the Due Process Clause argument, writing that if the tax “can be 
said to affect the freedom of egress from the state, or the freedom to contract, it is only incidentally and 
remotely.” Id. The plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim was based on the fact that recruiting workers who 
would remain in-state was not taxed. The Court ruled that treating businesses that recruited workers who 
would remain in the state differently than those who would induce workers to leave was reasonable and 
within the discretion of the state legislature. Id. at 276. 
 37.  See id. at 278 (holding that the business of hiring laborers and the labor contracts themselves 
were too attenuated from interstate traffic to be considered interstate commerce, and that the tax on 
those agents did not overly burden interstate commerce). 
 38.  See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918), overruled by United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (distinguishing between production of goods by child labor and the commerce 
itself in those goods). 
 39.  314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
 40.  Id. at 170–71. 
 41.  Id. at 172–73. 
 42.  Id. at 172. 
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from exercising their police power in matters of local concern even though they 
may thereby affect interstate commerce.”43 But among the limits to the police 
power, wrote Justice James Byrnes, none “is more certain than the prohibition 
against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties 
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property 
across its borders.”44 Quoting Justice Cardozo’s observation that the Constitution 
was framed on the theory that the states had to sink or swim together, the Court 
concluded that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a statute more squarely in conflict 
with this theory than the Section challenged here . . . . The burden upon interstate 
commerce is intended and immediate; it is the plain and sole function of the 
statute.”45 
Not all the Justices were enthusiastic about using the Commerce Clause as 
the right to travel’s textual anchor. Justice Douglas seemed almost offended by 
the notion, writing that “the right of persons to move freely from State to State 
occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the 
movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”46 Douglas, along with 
Justices Black, Murphy, and Jackson, favored the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the appropriate textual anchor for the 
right.47 
While the Commerce Clause remains an important foundation for the right 
to travel, contemporary cases—as we will see in the next Subpart—have 
continued to draw on a multiplicity of textual clauses, as well as structural 
inferences, when guaranteeing various aspects of this right. 
C. The Contemporary Court’s Right to Travel 
The contemporary right to interstate mobility has three separate components: 
(1) the right of citizens of State A to leave that state and enter State B; (2) “the 
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when 
temporarily present in the second State . . . .”; and (3) for those who wish to 
establish permanent residence, “the right to be treated like other citizens of that 
State.”48 
1. “Right to Enter and Leave” Cases 
The right to enter and leave one’s own state as well as other states was 
established in the earlier cases discussed above. By 1969, the Court could state 
unequivocally that: 
 
 43.  Id. at 172–73. 
 44.  Id. at 173. 
 45.  Id. at 174. For good measure, the Court repudiated language in City of New York v. Miln, 36 
U.S. 102, 142 (1837), suggesting that states could exclude “paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts” as 
the equivalents of “physical pestilence.” Edwards, 314 U.S. at 176. 
 46.  Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 47.  Black and Murphy joined Douglas’s opinion; Jackson concurred separately. Id. at 182 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 48.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). 
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The nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty 
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of 
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or 
restrict this movement.49 
Few state governments then, or now, would enact blatant attempts to 
interfere with entry into or exit from a state by taxing emigration or making 
migration to the state a crime. However, states have attempted to restrict access 
to services for out-of-state residents, have imposed various durational residency 
requirements on those from other states, and have sought to treat long-term 
residents more favorably than new arrivals. Invoking a variety of different 
constitutional provisions, the Court has declared that many of these laws 
interfere with the right to travel and struck them down.50 
2. “Welcome Visitor” Cases 
This category is exemplified by Edwards.51 While it is true that the would-be 
migrants themselves were not subject to criminal prosecution,52 the Court noted 
that the “indigents” were “the real victims of the statute” because they were 
“deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure on the California 
legislature to obtain a change in policy . . . .”53 
Consider as well Doe v. Bolton,54 in which the Court in 1973 invalidated a 
Georgia law that made Georgia residency a prerequisite for receiving an 
abortion. The appellants argued it violated the right to travel.55 Citing the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, the Court wrote that 
just as that clause “protects persons who enter other States to ply their trade . . . 
so it must protect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical services that 
are available there.”56 Otherwise, “a State could limit to its own residents the 
general medical care available within its borders.”57 
3. “Equal Treatment” Cases 
Somewhat more common are cases in which the Court has held that a state 
has interfered with the right to travel by imposing durational residency 
 
 49.  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651 (1974). 
 50.  See infra notes 54–87 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).  
 52.  I suspect, however, that persons entering the state without visible means of support would have 
been, at the time, subject to charges of vagrancy or loitering. See generally RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT 
NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016). For 
older treatments of vagrancy laws, see, for example, William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on 
Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. 
L. REV. 603 (1956); Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 1203 (1953). 
 53.  Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174. 
 54.  410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 55.  Id. at 200. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
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requirements or favoring long-term residents over new arrivals. Representative 
is Shapiro v. Thompson,58 the first of a number of cases in which the Court 
invalidated one-year durational residency requirements imposed on welfare 
recipients.59 In so doing, the Court relied on both the right to travel—which it 
characterized as a fundamental right60—and the Equal Protection Clause.61 The 
Court rejected the notion that the rational basis test should apply, holding instead 
that because “appellees were exercising a constitutional right”—the right to 
move “from State to State or to the District of Columbia”—“any classification 
which serve[d] to penalize the exercise that right” needed to be “necessary to 
promote a compelling governmental interest . . . .”62 
In 1999, the Court again invalidated a California law limiting new arrivals to 
the amount of public assistance they received in the state from which they 
migrated for one year.63 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court acknowledged the variegated 
nature of the right to travel,64 and that several separate constitutional provisions 
addressed themselves to different aspects of the right. It acknowledged the 
structural “right to go from one place to another” recognized in Edwards.65 The 
Court also mentioned the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which 
entitled “a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return 
home at the end of his journey” to be free “from the . . . disabilities of alienage in 
the other States . . . .”66 Finally, the Court noted that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed “the right of the newly arrived 
citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the 
same State”—a right “protected not only by the new arrival’s status as a state 
citizen, but also by her status as a citizen of the United States.”67 
The third aspect of the right to travel—the right of the new arrival to equal 
treatment—was where the California law bit. California argued that “its welfare 
scheme affect[ed] the right to travel only ‘incidentally’ because the interstate 
 
 58.  394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 59.  Id. at 622–25; see also, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating a 
durational residency requirement in order to receive non-emergency hospitalization at county expense); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invoking the language of strict scrutiny to strike down a one-
year residency requirement for voting). 
 60.  See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 (“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and 
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies 
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.” (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 
745, 757 (1966))). 
 61.  Id. at 633–38. 
 62.  Id. at 634. 
 63.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 64.  See id. at 500 (“The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different 
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to 
be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other 
citizens of that State.”).  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 501–02 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1968)). 
 67.  Id. at 502. 
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journey was complete.”68 However, the Court reasoned that “since the right to 
travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new State of 
residence, the discriminatory classification [based on tenure of residency was] 
itself a penalty.”69 
While it was unclear what particular standard of review the Court applied, 
and while it equivocated whether California’s fiscal justification was a legitimate 
interest, it said the question was whether “the State may accomplish that end by 
the discriminatory means it” chose.70 It was clear that a state may not create 
classes of citizens based on length of residency, and “[i]t [was] equally clear that 
the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause [did] not tolerate a hierarchy of 45 
subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on the location of their prior 
residence.”71 
In addition to being skeptical of durational residency requirements, the Court 
has condemned laws that advantage long-time residents over more recent 
arrivals. In Zobel v. Williams,72 the Court held that an Alaska law distributing oil 
revenue to its citizens in varying amounts based on length of residence could not 
even survive rational basis scrutiny. While the majority opinion alluded to the 
right to travel in passing, it purported to rest its decision solely on the Equal 
Protection Clause, writing that “[t]he only apparent justification for the 
retrospective aspect of the program, ‘favoring established residents over new 
residents,’ is constitutionally unacceptable.”73 
Similarly, the 1985 decision in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor74 
involved a New Mexico state property tax exemption for those who served on 
active duty in the Vietnam War for at least ninety days, but which was limited to 
veterans who were residents of the state as of May 8, 1976.75 The Court held that 
the statute was not rationally related to its stated objective to encourage Vietnam 
veterans to move to New Mexico: “The legislature cannot plausibly encourage 
veterans to move to the State by passing such retroactive legislation.”76 But while 
the state could use benefits to reward veterans, it “may not favor established 
residents over new residents based on the view that the State may take care of 
‘its own,’ if such is defined by prior residence.”77 Citing right-to-travel cases like 
Shapiro, the Court reasoned that by becoming bona fide residents, 
 
 68.  Id. at 504. 
 69.  Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted). 
 70.  Id. at 506. California conceded that a “desire to fence out the indigent” would not be a 
constitutionally permissible goal. Id. 
 71.  Id. at 506–07. 
 72.  457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
 73.  Id. at 65 (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 (1973)). Interestingly, despite Chief Justice 
Burger having written the majority opinion employing a rational basis test, it appears there were also five 
votes for the proposition that Alaska’s scheme violated the right to travel. 
 74.  472 U.S. 612 (1985). 
 75.  Id. at 614. 
 76.  Id. at 619. 
 77.  Id. at 623. 
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“[n]ewcomers . . . became the State’s ‘own’ and [thus could] not be discriminated 
against solely on the basis of their arrival in the State after May 8, 1976.”78 
Finally, Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez79 involved a law adding 
points to civil service exams for honorably-discharged veterans who served 
during wartime and who were New York residents when they entered service.80 
Justice Brennan’s opinion referred both to the right to travel and the Equal 
Protection Clause, noting that when state laws treat classes of residents 
differently regarding the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right, “we 
undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law” and “require[] the 
State to come forward with a compelling justification.”81 
New York offered four justifications for the law: (1) to encourage residents 
to serve in the military; (2) to compensate veterans for wartime service; (3) to 
induce veterans to return to New York; and (4) to secure for the civil service 
those who “possess useful experience acquired through their military service.”82 
All those interests suffered from the same weakness: “[E]ach . . . could be 
promoted fully by granting bonus points to all otherwise qualified veterans.”83 
Justice Brennan observed that “[b]ecause New York could accomplish its 
purposes without penalizing the right to migrate . . . the State [was] not free to 
promote its interests through a preference system that incorporates a prior 
residence requirement.”84 
D. The Right to Travel as a “Hybrid Right” 
Hybrid rights cases have received renewed attention from scholars in the 
wake of cases like Obergefell v. Hodges,85 in which the Court relied on the 
interaction between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to strike 
down state laws banning same-sex marriage.86 In a recent article, Michael Coenen 
observed that hybrid rights cases are merely one example of the Court combining 
constitutional clauses or doctrines in ways that “deriv[e] an overall conclusion of 
constitutional validity (or invalidity) from the joint decisional force of two or 
more constitutional provisions.”87 
Coenen argues that all clausal combination arguments have common 
characteristics. First, they arise when courts refer to two or more independently 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  476 U.S. 898 (1986). 
 80.  Id. at 900. 
 81.  Id. at 904. 
 82.  Id. at 909. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 910. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred but on the Zobel-Hooper rational 
basis approach. Id. at 912 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 916 (White, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor 
dissented, arguing that the preference program neither implicated the right to travel nor rights 
guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Id. at 925 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 85.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 86.  Id. at 2602–05. 
 87.  Coenen, supra note 6, at 1070. 
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relevant provisions to resolve a constitutional question.88 Obergefell’s invocation 
of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as relevant to the 
adjudication of same-sex marriage bans is a recent example. Second, they rely on 
two or more clauses “in conjunction with one another” to “support[] a particular 
judicial outcome . . . .”89 Third, the clauses’ relationship is a “coordinate” not a 
“derivative” one: “Combination arguments do not necessarily arise when one 
clause incorporates by reference the contents of another.”90 Examples here 
include the Court’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction 
with another Article I power to uphold a federal law.91 Fourth, “[c]ombination 
arguments group clauses together for the purpose of creating reasons for judicial 
results, not for the purposes of clarifying matters of semantic uncertainty.”92 
Thus, “combination arguments might be distinguished from in pari materia or 
intratextual arguments regarding ambiguous words or phrases in the 
constitutional text.”93 
Coenen identifies four different combinations that the Court sometimes 
employs: (1) right/right combinations; (2) right/no-power combinations; (3) 
power/power combinations; and (4) subclausal combinations.94 “Right/right 
combinations” describe the combinations in hybrid right cases and are the ones 
with the most relevance to the right-to-travel cases.95 
In right/right cases, courts will combine two independent rights in ways that 
“sometimes yield[] a more restrictive set of limits on government action than 
what would exist in the combination’s absence.”96 Discussing Obergefell’s 
invocation of both due process and equal protection, Coenen observes that in so 
doing, the Court “conveys a relatively simple idea: the Due Process Clause alone 
might fail to resolve the question of whether a ban on same-sex marriage is 
constitutional, but once the Equal Protection Clause is added to the picture, the 
question can come out only one way.”97 
It seems clear that nearly all of the right-to-travel cases are marked by 
right/right combinations. Consider the Court’s description of the right to travel 
from Soto-Lopez: 
The textual source of the constitutional right to travel, or, more precisely, the right of 
free interstate migration . . . has proved elusive. It has been variously assigned to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV . . . to the Commerce Clause, . . . and to the 
 
 88.  Id. at 1075. 
 89.  Id. at 1076. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) 
(holding that Congress may regulate intrastate activity if it is so closely related to interstate commerce 
that it is appropriate for Congress to do so; implicitly invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 92.  Id. at 1077. 
 93.  Id. For the leading example of the latter, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 747 (1999). 
 94.  Coenen, supra note 6, at 1078. 
 95.  Id. at 1089 (citation omitted). 
 96.  Id. at 1078. 
 97.  Id. at 1079 (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)). 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The right has also 
been inferred from the federal structure of government adopted by our Constitution. . . 
. However, in light of the unquestioned historic acceptance of the principle of free 
interstate migration, and of the important role that principle has played in transforming 
many States into a single Nation, we have not felt impelled to locate this right 
definitively in any particular constitutional provision. . . . Whatever its origin, the right 
to migrate is firmly established and has been repeatedly recognized by our cases.98 
The most recent right-to-travel case, Saenz v. Roe, likewise located the right in 
various constitutional provisions.99 
In many of the cases described above—the durational residency 
requirements, for example—the Equal Protection Clause alone might have failed 
to resolve the cases in the challengers’ favor. Whatever else may be said about 
such requirements, they are hardly irrational; and they often were imposed in 
pursuit of legitimate goals like fiscal prudence or the husbanding of resources. 
But when the right to interstate migration is thrown in, such restrictions are 
subject at least to heightened, if not strict, scrutiny. 
In Part IV, I argue that New York Rifle presents another right/right 
combination: the right to travel and the Second Amendment. This aspect of the 
case was not properly appreciated by the Second Circuit. I further argue that the 
combination should—as the right/right combination in the right-to-travel cases 
themselves did—cause the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the New York 
ordinance, even if the application of neither right in isolation would produce that 
result. At the very least, the Court should hold that New York presented 
insufficient evidence that its ordinance satisfied even intermediate scrutiny. 
The next Part, however, describes New York’s premises permitting scheme 
and how it burdens both the Second Amendment and the right to travel. It also 
summarizes the Second Circuit’s decision to uphold the ordinance and reject the 
constitutional challenges to it. 
 
III 
NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
I begin with the facts of New York Rifle and a description of the Second 
Circuit’s analysis of the constitutional challenges brought against the New York 
rule. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the rule violated the Second 
Amendment, the right to travel, the DCCD, and the First Amendment. I focus 
primarily on the Second Amendment and right-to-travel claims, and discuss the 
DCCD claim only in passing.100 
 
 98.  Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902–03 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 99.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–03 (1999). 
 100.  The First Amendment challenge is beyond the scope of this Article and I omit analysis of it 
entirely. 
BOOK PROOF - DENNING (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2020  10:12 PM 
110 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:97 
A. Facts 
New York state law requires a license to possess a firearms—which include 
pistols, revolvers, assault weapons, as well as certain shortened rifles and 
shotguns.101 In order to get a handgun license, one must apply to a “local licensing 
officer,” which in New York City is the city police commissioner.102 One may 
either apply for a “carry” license or a “premises” license. As the terms imply, a 
carry permit allows you to carry a handgun without any occupational or 
geographic restrictions.103 A premises permit, on the other hand, “is specific to 
the premises for which it has been issued” and “allows a licensee to ‘have and 
possess in his dwelling’ a pistol or revolver.”104 The firearm may not, except in 
limited circumstances, be removed from the premises listed on the permit.105 
The exceptions include transportation to and from an authorized small arms 
range/shooting club and when hunting. When in transit, the firearm must be 
unloaded and in a locked container, with the ammunition carried separately.106 
According to regulations, an “authorized small arms range/shooting club” is 
defined as one that is located in New York City.107 There were seven such 
facilities in New York City, including at least one in each of the City’s five 
boroughs.108 
Until 2001, the New York Police Department (NYPD) issued target licenses 
that allowed licensees “to take his or her handgun to shooting ranges and 
competitions outside New York City.”109 After receiving “reports that licensees 
were using target licenses to carry weapons to many other locations, and not in 
the requisite unloaded and enclosed condition[,]” the NYPD “eliminated the 
target license . . . .”110 The plaintiffs in the case wanted to travel to ranges and 
shooting competitions outside New York City, including ranges and competitions 
in other states.111 In addition, one plaintiff wished to transport his firearm to a 
second home he owned outside New York City.112 The Second Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment, dormant Commerce Clause, and right-to-
travel challenges to the rule. 
 
 101.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 939 (2019), and vacated as moot, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 52–53. 
 104.  Id. at 53. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 53–54. 
 110.  Id. at 54. 
 111.  Id. at n.4. 
 112.  Id. 
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B. Second Amendment Challenge 
On the Second Amendment claim, the court applied a two-step inquiry that 
asked (1) whether the regulation impinged activity protected by the Second 
Amendment and (2) if so, what the appropriate level of scrutiny should be.113 But 
the court skipped the first step, holding that the rule survived intermediate 
scrutiny.114 In determining that intermediate, as opposed to strict, scrutiny was 
appropriate, the court was guided by two factors: (1) how much of the core 
Second Amendment right was implicated and (2) the severity of the burden on 
that right.115 The core of the Second Amendment, as the court read Heller,116 is 
the right to possess weapons like handguns in the home for self-defense.117 The 
severity of the burden triggering heightened scrutiny, in turn, “is triggered only 
by those restrictions that (like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down 
in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to 
possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”118 
The plaintiffs complained that the rule violated their Second Amendment 
rights by preventing them from transporting their licensed handguns to their 
second home outside New York City and to shooting competitions or ranges 
beyond the five boroughs. The court rejected both arguments. 
Comparing the restrictions to New York’s “may issue” regulatory regime for 
carry permits, the court wrote that the residence permit restrictions “impose at 
most trivial limitations on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use 
firearms for self-defense.”119 Nothing in the transport rule impeded the plaintiffs 
in the exercise of their core Second Amendment rights. Because the plaintiff with 
the second home could obtain a separate residence permit for the second home, 
the court concluded that he had adequate alternatives for the exercise of the core 
right.120 It added further that the plaintiff had not presented evidence that costs 
associated with securing a second premises license or firearm for the second 
home “would be so high as to be exclusionary or prohibitive.”121 
As for the plaintiffs complaining of their inability to transport their guns to 
out-of-City ranges and shooting competitions, the court was equally unmoved. It 
conceded that “restrictions that limit the ability of firearms owners to acquire and 
maintain proficiency in the use of their weapons” could potentially “rise to a level 
that significantly burdens core Second Amendment protection,” but rejected the 
argument that the right to practice was itself part of that core Second 
 
 113.  Id. at 55. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 56. 
 116.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 117.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 883 F.3d at 56. 
 118.  Id. (quoting United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 119.  Id. at 57. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id.  
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Amendment right.122 Burdens on acquiring and maintaining proficiency 
moreover would be protected “only to the extent that” regulations amounting 
“to a ban (either explicit or functional) on obtaining firearms training and 
practice substantially burden the core right to keep and use firearms in self-
defense in the home.”123 Here, the availability of ranges and the lack of evidence 
that the fees charged by the firing ranges were “prohibitively expensive” led the 
court to conclude that New York City had not “imposed an unreasonable burden 
on a resident’s ability to pursue firearms training” and thus did not raise 
constitutional concerns.124 
Despite its doubts that the restrictions at issue did not approach the core of 
the Second Amendment, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to the rule in 
light of all of the plaintiffs’ claims. It held that the rule sought to serve the 
“substantial, indeed compelling” interest in “protecting public safety and 
preventing crime” by, among other things, preventing “road rage, ‘crowd 
situations, demonstrations, family disputes,’ and other situations ‘where it would 
be better to note have the presence of a firearm.’”125 The court additionally 
acknowledged New York’s monitoring and enforcement rationales for the rule.126 
By contrast, the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate “that the Rule impose[d] 
substantial burdens on their protected rights,”127 and therefore the court 
concluded that “the City ha[d] met its burden of showing a substantial fit between 
the Rule and the City’s interest in promoting public safety.”128 
C. The Court’s Right to Travel Analysis 
After concluding that the Rule did not violate the DCCD,129 the Second 
Circuit considered whether the rule violated the plaintiffs’ right to travel. 
 
 122.  Id. at 58. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 60. 
 125.  Id. at 62–63. 
 126.  See id. at 63 (noting that the former Commander of the License Division’s affidavit documented 
“abuses” prior to adoption of the rule, where licensees were found with loaded firearms far from any 
authorized range, including on airplanes, and that those licensees, when discovered, would “create an 
explanation about traveling for target practice or shooting competition”). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 64. 
 129.  I have omitted the Court’s DCCD analysis for the sake of space. In brief, the DCCD is the judge-
made doctrine that infers limits on state and local governments’ ability to discriminate against or unduly 
burden interstate commerce from the Constitution’s grant of power over that commerce to Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a description of the doctrine’s development, see generally Brannon P. 
Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 427–48 
(2008). Under the modern doctrine, laws that “discriminat[e] against out-of-state goods or nonresident 
economic actors” must demonstrate a legitimate (that is, nonprotectionist) end, and that there are no less 
discriminatory means available to effectuate that end. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. 
Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 (2019). Truly nondiscriminatory—but burdensome—laws require 
challengers to demonstrate that the burden on interstate commerce “is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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Interestingly, with one exception,130 the court cited only its own prior cases, 
ignoring the extensive body of right-to-travel cases decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. According to the Second Circuit, while the right to travel is fundamental, 
“that local regulations ‘[m]erely hav[e] an effect on travel is not sufficient to raise 
an issue of constitutional dimension.’”131 According to the court, the right is 
“implicated only when the statute ‘actually deters such travel, or when impedance 
of travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves 
to penalize the exercise of that right.’”132 
In the panel’s view, the rule did none of those things.133 Rather, it simply 
restricted their premises-permitted weapons to those residences to which the 
permit applied: “The Constitution protects the right to travel,” the court wrote, 
“not the right to travel armed.”134 Nor was the rule designed to impede travel; it 
was designed to protect city residents’ welfare.135 Finally, the rule did not “impose 
a significant disincentive to travel, any more than any other regulation that limits 
the possession in one jurisdiction of items that may be more broadly permitted in 
another.”136 The court concluded that the rule constituted at most a “minor 




NEW YORK RIFLE AS A HYBRID RIGHTS CASE 
The Second Circuit did what many courts would do when presented with 
multiple constitutional challenges—it separated them and analyzed each claim 
separately. Indeed, in a forthcoming article discussing judicial responses to 
constitutional overlap, Michael Coenen argues that this ought to be the default 
rule.138 But it is not the only possible response. Courts can combine overlapping 
clauses and treat the resulting combination “as a reason to ratchet up scrutiny of 
the government action under review” and to “eliminate redundancy.”139 Finally, 
 
 130.  The court quoted United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966), in which the Supreme Court 
characterized the right to interstate travel as “fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.” 
 131.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 883 F.3d at 66 (quoting Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
755 F.2d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 132.  Id. at 66–67 (quoting Soto-Lopez, 755 F.2d at 279). 
 133.  See id. at 67 (“Nothing in the Rule prevents the Plaintiffs from engaging in intrastate or interstate 
travel as they wish.”). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See id. (“The Rule was not designed to impede interstate travel and the history behind it 
‘demonstrates that its purpose was not to impede travel but to protect the welfare of [city] residents.’”). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ claim that the rule infringed their First Amendment 
freedom of association rights. Id. at 67–68. This claim was not one on which the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, so I omit discussion of it as well. 
 138.  Michael Coenen, Four Responses to Constitutional Overlap, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3430030 [https://perma.cc/R6YF-
JYZ8]. 
 139.  Id. 
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a court can displace overlapping constitutional rules by identifying one of the 
rules as “the exclusive avenue of constitutional inquiry.”140 The classic example 
is where governmental action could be challenged under a specific provision of 
the Bill of Rights or cast as a substantive Due Process claim, the Supreme Court 
has held that the constitutional analysis should proceed under the more specific 
provision.141 
The Second Circuit’s separate analyses of the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment 
and right-to-travel claims are open to criticism. For example, though the court 
purported to apply a form of intermediate scrutiny to the rule under the Second 
Amendment, it seemed to require the plaintiffs to prove that their rights were 
significantly burdened, instead of requiring New York to prove that the ban was 
substantially related to any important governmental interests. It accepted at face 
value the state’s claim that the earlier rule under which premises licensees could 
transport their guns outside the city was subject to abuse, rather than require it 
to demonstrate the magnitude of the abuse and why something short of a total 
ban of transport outside the city would not effectively address those issues. 
The panel’s right-to-travel analysis was equally flawed. Curiously, it cited only 
one U.S. Supreme Court case for the general proposition that the right to travel 
was a fundamental one. It then quoted its own precedent for the proposition that 
the right is implicated only if (1) travel is actually deterred, (2) the primary 
purpose was to deter travel, or (3) travel is actually penalized.142 Even on those 
terms, one might question the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the right to travel 
was not impacted or that it wasn’t intended to deter travel. I further question the 
Second Circuit’s narrow characterization of the right itself, which seems a more 
limited right than that recognized in the Supreme Court’s recent cases. Neither 
Alaska’s policy of distributing larger shares of its oil revenue to long-time 
residents,143 nor California’s one-year limitation of welfare benefits to new 
arrivals to the amount received in their former state of residence144 physically 
prevented or was even intended to significantly deter interstate migration. The 
same goes for adding points to the civil service exams of those who were residents 
when they entered the military.145 Moreover, one might suspect whether the 
actual effect on decisions to travel were as incidental as the Second Circuit 
claimed they were in its opinion. 
Further, in none of the right-to-travel cases did the Supreme Court treat the 
questions as involving, for example, “a right to travel to receive equal welfare 
benefits,” or “a right to travel to receive a veteran’s preference.” Rather, the 
Court considered both the right to travel and the right to equal treatment as 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. (discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). 
 142.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 883 F.3d at 66–67. 
 143.  See discussion of Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), supra notes 75–76 and accompanying 
text. 
 144.  See discussion of Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text 
 145.  See discussion of Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986), supra notes 82–87 
and accompanying text. 
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combining to require heightened scrutiny, even if the Court nominally employed 
a rational basis test in analyzing the government’s justification for the laws 
discussed above. 
Likewise, it should have been no answer for the Second Circuit, in considering 
the merits of the plaintiffs’ right-to-travel claim, to say that the right to travel did 
not encompass “the right to travel armed.”146 In fact, I would argue that it begged 
the question of whether the plaintiffs had stated a right/right claim that merited 
consideration of the right to keep and bear arms and the right to travel together. 
Before answering that question, however, a little brush needs to be cleared. 
According to Coenen, there are “combination errors” that one should take care 
to avoid when employing this technique: (1) non-counting errors; (2) double-
counting errors; (3) “failure to honor the negative implications created by one of 
the clauses” combined; and (4) disregard of “transactional unity.”147 None of 
these errors plague the analysis I propose here and should not prevent the 
Justices from treating New York Rifle as a hybrid rights case, should it choose to 
address the merits. 
Non-counting errors occur “when a court fails to notice the combination-
based origins of a precedent on which it relies” and applies it to a case lacking 
that same combination of clauses thus resulting in “an artificial expansion of the 
prior holding’s scope . . . .” 148 Double counting occurs when a court combines 
“constitutional clauses that have already been combined.”149 For example, 
Coenen argues, courts should not combine the First Amendment’s free speech 
and free press clauses because the strong presumption against prior restraints has 
incorporated press protections into the free speech clause already.150 “A further 
type of combination error stems from a court’s failure to honor the negative 
implications created by one of the clauses it combines.”151 It would be improper, 
he argues, to combine, say, the Copyright Clause—which speaks of a grant of 
copyright “for limited Times”—with the Commerce Clause to produce a 
perpetual copyright.152 Finally, there is the “idea that separate and distinct 
constitutional events merit separate and distinct constitutional conclusions.”153 A 
public school student suspended because of a risqué speech delivered at an 
assembly, who is then later disciplined for another incident in which he claims his 
Due Process rights were violated would not have a strong case for combination 
because of the lack of “transactional unity.”154 
 
 146.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 883 F.3d at 67. 
 147.  Coenen, supra note 6, at 1121–30. 
 148.  Id. at 1121. 
 149.  Id. at 1122. 
 150.  See id. at 1123 (“A moment’s perusal of the relevant case law reveals that the protections of the 
Press Clause have already been baked into the Court’s strong presumption against prior restraints.”). 
 151.  Id. at 1125. 
 152.  Id. at 1126. 
 153.  Id. at 1128. 
 154.  Id. 
BOOK PROOF - DENNING (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2020  10:12 PM 
116 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:97 
Taking these errors in reverse order, there is no question that transactional 
unity is present in New York Rifle. The court’s very framing of the issue as a “right 
to travel armed” suggested that the panel itself yoked these two rights together 
and saw both affected by the rule. Nor are there any negative implications that 
my proposed combination of the right to travel and the right to keep and bear 
arms ignores as there would be if, say, the Second Amendment’s text somehow 
implied that it was limited to the home. In fact, insofar as the text mentions a 
right to “bear” arms, it cuts the other way, suggesting some right to carry or 
transport outside the home. Double counting isn’t an issue because none of the 
right-to-travel cases incorporate Second Amendment principles, and Heller made 
no mention of public carry. Finally, combining the right to travel and the Second 
Amendment would not artificially expand either the right-to-travel cases or the 
Second Amendment. 
In fact, treating New York Rifle as a hybrid rights case and invalidating the 
New York rule on that basis would provide a relatively narrow ground for 
decision. Perhaps the biggest unanswered question about Heller is the extent to 
which it applies to the public carrying of arms. Instead of attempting to answer 
that question, with all of its attendant implications for state concealed- and open-
carry laws, the Supreme Court could simply hold that, say, for the plaintiff with 
the second home, he has the right to travel with his unloaded, secured weapon to 
his second home so it is available for use in self-defense without having to go to 
the trouble and expense of securing a second weapon and a second premises 
permit. This would leave for another day—and perhaps for a better case—the 
question of the Second Amendment’s scope beyond the home, on which the 




New York Rifle offered an opportunity for the Court to add to the universe 
of hybrid rights cases that clearly exists, but for which the Court has provided 
precious little in the way of either theorizing or guidance for lower courts in their 
identification and application. Alas, in all likelihood the Court will find the case 
moot and any explanation will have to await another day. That is unfortunate, 
because as recent scholarship has suggested, there are reasons to think that 
constitutional combinations—whether of rights and rights or rights and powers—
yield some interesting answers to a number of doctrinal conundrums in 
constitutional law. 
 
